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Social representations, alternative representations and semantic barriers 
 
Social representations research has tended to focus upon the representations that 
groups have in relation to some object. The present article elaborates the concept of 
social representations by pointing to the existence of ‘alternative representations’ as 
sub-components within social representations. Alternative representations are the 
ideas and images the group has about how other groups represent the given object. 
Alternative representations are thus representations of other people’s representations. 
The present article uses data from Moscovici’s (1974/2008) analysis of the diffusion 
of psychoanalysis to examine how people engage with alternative representations. It is 
demonstrated that there can be more or less dialogical relations with alternative 
representations. The analysis concludes by considering seven ‘semiotic barriers’ 
which work to neutralise the dialogical potential of alternative representations, thus on 
the one hand enabling groups to talk about the views of others, while, on the other 
hand, remaining unchallenged by those views. 
 
 
Keywords: Alternative representations, semantic barriers, social representations, 
dialogicality, difference 
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 Social representations, alternative representations and semantic barriers 
 
In Psychoanalysis: Its Image and Its Public Moscovici (1974/2008) introduces the 
concept of social representation by discussing the heterogeneous nature of modern 
society. Durkheim (1898) had used the concept of collective representations to study 
hegemonic and homogenous representations, such as myth and religion, in traditional 
societies. The interesting point about Durkhim’s concept of collective representations, 
which Mosciovici (p. 3) highlights is the “mixed” position of this concept between 
psychology and sociology. On the one hand collective representations are produced 
by societies, yet, on the other hand, they are part of individual psychological 
functioning to the extent of structuring the minutiae of perception. For example, a 
person fully socialised in a religion perceives the world through the lens of that 
religion: events can become the visible manifestations of the will of the given god. 
The concept of collective representations raises, for social psychology, a profound 
question: Exactly what is the relation between society in general, or social relations in 
particular, and psychological function? This question is central to Psychoanalysis and 
the present article. 
 
Moscovici (2008) makes a case for revitalising the concept of collective 
representations, but under the new name of ‘social representations.’ The reason for the 
shift of terminology is because the state of knowledge in late modernity is more 
pluralistic and fragmented than theorised by Durkheim. Moscovici (2008, p. 5) 
describes myth, or collective representations, as they existed in previous times as 
“total” while “social representations are, for modern man, no more than one of many 
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ways of understanding”. The structural differentiation of society has created an 
increasing number of niche groups each with its own discourse, while globalisation 
has brought knowledge systems previously separated by geography into close 
proximity. The conjunction of these two factors means that “we are witnessing the 
emergence of very heterogeneous political, philosophical, religious, and artistic 
practices” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 5). One can find examples of the clash of 
representations in the tensions between secular government and religion and in the 
relatively recent tensions between common sense and science (Bauer & Gaskell, 
2002). In these and other contexts we are witnessing the breakdown of collective, 
homogenous and ‘total’ knowledge structures and the emergence of a pluralistic field 
of representations. Accordingly people are now navigating between knowledges and 
discourses, choosing which is relevant for the given context, and able to defend that 
choice in relation to possible alternatives.  
 
If, as Moscovici (2008, p. 6) states, “social representations both have an autonomous 
psychological texture, and are specific to our society and culture,” then what is the 
relation between the current conditions of plurality and that psychological texture? If 
we have moved from a sociological condition of collective representation to one of 
social representation, then what does this shift imply for contemporary psychological 
function? It might be tempting to assume that an increasing plurality of co-existing 
representations would lead to an increasing plurality of mind, or at least tolerance for 
alternative forms of knowledge, but the present article will show that such an 
assumption is not warranted. 
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The empirical research reported in Psychoanalysis concerns the movement of 
knowledge, namely psychoanalysis, from science into common sense. The question 
Moscovici asks is: how has psychoanalysis, a novel theory produced by a sub-group 
of scientists, diffused into French society? Methodologically the strategy is to 
compare how psychoanalysis has been appropriated by different groups, such as 
Communists, Catholics, students, professionals, and workers. His aim is not to reveal 
the denigration of scientific knowledge in common sense, but rather to examine the 
creative re-interpretation and appropriation of the knowledge as it is re-constructed 
for new ends.  
 
The questions that I want to address in the present article build upon Moscovici’s 
analysis. If there is such a plurality of social representations in contemporary 
societies, how do social representations themselves deal with this condition of 
plurality? How do these representations adapt to alternative representations? And 
specifically, at a psychological level, how do they enable individuals to negotiate the 
plurality of alternative and potentially competing representations which contemporary 
society confronts them with? How do they enable those who live by them to engage 
with alternative, potentially competing and contradictory representations? And, at a 
more general level, what psychological consequences follow from the contemporary 
sociological condition of a multiplicity of discourses and representations? 
 
The present article begins by examining communication and social representation in 
order to make the case for the representation of difference. In so far as social 
representations are reflexive and enable communication with alternative 
representations, it is argued that within representations there must be alternative 
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representations – that is representations of other people’s representations. Alternative 
representations are thus presented as important dialogical sub-parts to certain social 
representations, enabling those representations adapt to the plurality of 
representations. The existence of these alternative representations is demonstrated by 
reanalysing data from Moscovici’s Psychoanalysis. Focusing on propaganda, a form 
of communication one might naively consider as monological (Trey, 1998), it is 
shown that propaganda does not simply ignore alternative representations. The 
analysis reveals that propaganda can incorporate alternative representations, and even 
dialogically orient to those alternatives. However, semantic barriers are used to 
neutralise the transformative and dialogical potential of these alternative 
representations. The article concludes by considering how these semantic barriers 
enable propaganda to persist in a pluralistic world of competing alternative 
representations. 
 
Social representations: A shared context for communication 
 
Social representations have two functions, they enable people to master their material 
and social worlds and they enable people to communicate (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii, 
2008, p. xxxi; Voelklien & Howarth, 2005). One can conceive of this definition as 
relating systematically to the different sides of the social psychological (self-other-
object) triangle (Moscovici, 1972, p. 52; see also Bauer & Gaskell, THIS SPECIAL 
ISSUE; Marková, 2003). The instrumental function pertains primarily to the self-
object relation, while the communicative function pertains primarily to the self-other 
relation. 
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This two-part definition is borne out in the empirical analysis presented in 
Psychoanalysis. The instrumental function is evident in the way in which people use 
psychoanalysis to understand themselves and others. Adolescents in particular are 
shown to use psychoanalysis to make sense of themselves. The communicative 
function is evident in the analysis of how people talk about psychoanalysis and in the 
circulation and elaboration of the representation in the mass media. Moscovici (2008) 
describes representations as being “a medium of exchange” (p. xxxi) and “instruments 
of exchange” (p. 121). They enable a group to coordinate itself in relation to the given 
object, and also to establish, or reinforce, the group identity and history. Within the 
analysis we find that Catholics, for example, have developed a shared language for 
talking about psychoanalysis in terms of confession. Talking about psychoanalysis in 
terms of confession gives mastery of psychoanalysis on the one hand while 
strengthening the position of Catholic institutions and practices on the other.  
 
It is the communicative function of social representations that I want to focus upon. 
Moscovici (1994) has theorised the relation between social representations and 
communication in a separate paper. In that paper he suggests that social 
representations can be both explicit in the content of communication and implicit in 
the context – “buried under the layers of words and images” (p. 168). Sometimes the 
content of a representation is talked about and explicitly communicated, but at other 
times it is only evident if one interprets the assumptions being made within the 
communication. Van Dijk (1980) makes a useful distinction between the text of an 
utterance (i.e., what is actually said) and the context (i.e., everything in the 
background that informs the utterance, including presuppositions and the semantic 
frame which is assumed to be shared). Using the language of van Dijk, then, we could 
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say that social representations are communicated in both the text and context of an 
utterance. They are communicated in the context when they are being used as a means 
of communicating, and they are in the text, when the representation itself becomes a 
topic of conversation. 
 
The idea that communication is built upon a semantic context which the interlocutors 
assume they share was illustrated powerfully by Garfinkel (1984) in his analysis of a 
husband and wife talking about what was done during the day. What is actually 
spoken is so truncated that it is almost impossible for an outsider to make sense of the 
communication. Single words invoke whole meaning complexes. The actual 
communication is rich, although the words exchanged seem to be impoverished. This 
is possible because of the degree of shared semantic context between the husband and 
wife. The meaning arises not in the text, but in the relation between the text and the 
context.  
 
Considering the shared context closely reveals that it is not sufficient to conceive of it 
simply as a collection of shared and agreed upon meanings. If the context were 
completely shared it would be questionable whether anything either needed to be said 
or indeed could be said. The shared context includes difference in the sense of 
divergent and alternative perspectives. Indeed, the following section argues that such 
difference, or more precisely the representation of such difference, is in fact central to 
communication.  
 
Difference & the representation of difference 
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While theorising social representations as the context of pragmatic communication, 
Moscovici (1994) makes an important and insightful point regarding difference. He 
points out that, although there needs to be a shared context for communication to take 
place, there also needs to be some difference between the speakers otherwise there 
would be nothing to communicate about. He writes: 
 
[A] social representation is not completely shared, it is only partially 
distributed, just as part of the meaning of words is known to some people and 
unknown to others. Therefore everyone lacks some item of the knowledge that 
other speakers possess. [new paragraph] I can even add that if all people 
pictured things to themselves in a similar way, they would be nothing but 
mirrors engaged in specular conversations. In short, they would be a mass of 
individuals reproduced in thousands of exemplars, not a real society. In real 
societies, people routinely understand some statements as agreeing with their 
social representation and others as conflicting with it. (Moscovici, 1994, p. 
168) 
 
Not only does there need to be a shared context against which something can be said, 
there also needs to be a difference between interlocutors which can become the basis 
of something to say. In the context of social life, difference is rarely neutral and most 
often manifests as tension and conflict. It is more often disagreements than 
agreements which keep people talking. Hannah Arendt (1958) made a similar point 
about communication being possible because of both sharedness and difference. In 
developing upon Arendt’s work, Jovchelovitch phrases the interdependency in the 
following way:  
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 It is because people are different – and yet the same – that action and speech 
become necessary: if we were all identical there would be no need to 
communicate and to act upon an unvarying sameness; if we had nothing in 
common at all the very process of speech would lose its basis and action 
would not justify itself. (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 85) 
 
The possibility of communication is born out of similarity, while the necessity of 
communication is born out of difference. It is this tension between similarity and 
difference that characterises the public sphere – the public space in which divergent 
interests clash and people negotiate coordinated social action. Social representations, 
as described in the previous section, provide the shared basis for communication. But, 
they are also the source of difference which makes communication necessary. 
 
Although Arendt, Moscovici and Jovchelovitch use the concept of difference in 
diverse ways, and with distinct emphasis, they all recognise the importance for 
communication of not just sameness, but also difference. Focusing upon the nature of 
this difference, I suggest that communication entails not just difference, but also some 
representation of that difference. If there was difference without any representation of 
that difference, without awareness of that difference, then there would be 
misunderstanding, that is, a failure of communication (Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 
1966). Indeed, the need to say something might not even arise. For example, in 
analysing why Person A asked Person B a question, it is not enough to say that they 
did this because Person B knew the answer. Person A asked the question because they 
assumed that Person B might know the answer (regardless of whether Person B 
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actually does know the answer). That is to say, Person A represented a possible 
difference between themselves and Person B.  
 
Let us consider an example from Moscovici’s (2008) Psychoanalysis. Consider the 
following utterance, made by a liberal professional in response to a question about the 
popularization of psychoanalysis: 
 
As far as the general public is concerned, these [psychoanalytic] ideas just 
disturb people and fill their heads with wild imaginings (p. 50) 
 
There are three parts to this utterance. First, there is the question which motivated it, 
and that question implied a context of possible debate. The question made the 
assumption that some people would be for the popularization of psychoanalysis, and 
other people against it. Second, the first part of the utterance adds a contextual 
consideration for the answer to follow, it is narrowing the focus of popularization on 
“the general public”. Although the text of the utterance is “as far as the general public 
is concerned” and thus focuses the conversation on the general public, the need to 
make salient this focus implies that what follows might not be true for specialist 
groups, such as doctors or academics. Third, the final part of the utterance, which 
answers the question, takes a position in the contextual semantic field which is 
assumed to be shared (i.e., that the conversation is about being for or against the 
popularization of psychoanalysis to the general public). The position is that 
psychoanalysis should not be popularized, as it disturbs people by filling their heads 
with “wild imaginings.” The utterance stakes a position vis-à-vis the possible 
alternative (i.e., that psychoanalysis fills people’s heads with sensible ideas). In 
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stating a position (the text), the context (i.e. the alternative possibility that 
psychoanalysis fills people’s heads with sensible ideas) is invoked. It is the existence 
of the alternative, as part of the shared context, which makes the utterance worth 
saying. Without the possibility that psychoanalysis gave people sensible ideas, in a 
context where psychoanalysis could only be conceived of as “wild imaginings”, then 
this utterance would have no meaning – it would be like saying psychoanalysis is 
psychoanalysis. In Billig’s (1993) sense, this utterance is rhetorical. The meaning of 
the utterance lies in its positioning vis a vis what has not been said but assumed. The 
utterance assumes difference and the speaker, to some extent, is aware of that 
difference and assumes that any interlocutor is also aware of those differences. 
 
Each of the three aspects of this seemingly simple utterance is based upon difference. 
The interviewer assumes a difference in asking the question. The speaker assumes 
that the interviewer may take what is about to be said as pertaining to all groups, thus 
assuming a different interpretation to the one intended. And finally, the speaker takes 
a position that is staked against an assumed difference, namely that psychoanalysis 
fills people’s heads with sense. Thus, within an utterance we can see that at each step, 
when something is said, there is an implicit representation of difference – which is 
part of the context which is assumed to be shared by the interlocutor.  
 
Alternative Representations 
 
The representation of difference, which along side a shared context lies at the heart of 
communication, can also help us to address one of the questions posed at the outset of 
this article, namely, how representations enable people live amongst a plurality of 
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potentially competing representations. In order to theorise this I suggest a sub-
component of social representations which can be called ‘alternative representations.’ 
 
Alternative representations refer to the representation of a potentially competing 
representation from within a social representation. They are evident whenever we 
hear the phrases “they think” or “they claim” or “they say”. Alternative 
representations only exist within social representations. They are that part of a social 
representation that orients to the social representations held by others. They are 
representations in the sense of being coherent theories. They have a logic and an 
internal coherence. They may, if very elaborate, even have iconic cores which can be 
generative. However, they tend to be quite shallow and are popularly called ‘straw 
men.’ That is to say, they usually simplify and stereotype the alternative. Alternative 
representations only exist as dialogical shadows within polemical or emancipated 
representations. They are shadows in the sense of reflecting, usually in a distorted and 
very simplified form, the social representation of other groups. They are also shadows 
in the sense that they are firmly attached to what the speaker wants to say, and are a 
sort of inverse of what the speaker wants to say. Alternative representations are ‘alter’ 
in the sense of being attributed to other people and in the sense of being foreign 
objects within the given representation. Alternative representations are the Alter 
within the given social representation.  
 
Alternative representations are peculiar because they can both destabilize and stabilize 
the given social representation of which they are a part. In so far as the alternative 
representation represents a real alternative to the main representation, then it can be 
destabilizing – posing a challenge to the core. Yet alternative representations can also 
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protect the main representation from the challenge of alternatives. One could conceive 
of alternative representations as elements in the periphery of the representation that 
protect the core from counter arguments1. That is to say, they enable those using the 
given representation to avoid seeming naïve, to be aware of alternatives, and even to 
dialogically resist alternative arguments. In some cases, however, the core of the 
given representation is actually shaped by the alternative in the sense of it being first 
and foremost a position taken vis-à-vis the alternative.  
 
Alternative representations are not representations of others, but the ideas which are 
attributed to real or imagined others. Of course there is a close relation between how 
we represent others and the ideas we attribute to them, but the focus of the concept of 
alternative representations is on the latter. It is because of this that they are 
alternatives to the main representation – because they have the same object as the 
main representation. In this sense, alternative representations are always second-hand. 
They are always attributed to someone else and thus are always bracketed, held in a 
state of disbelief, open to questioning and critique. In contemporary society, the very 
heterogeneity that Moscovici highlights in the opening of Psychoanalysis ensures that 
we cannot converse only with people who represent the world in a similar way to 
ourselves. Alternative representations enable communication between groups.  
 
Examples of alternative representations abound in Psychoanalysis. In the interview 
excerpts, one can read interviewees talking about what other individuals and groups 
think about psychoanalysis. Alternative representations are attributed to family 
members, priests, the Pope, authors, fictional characters, Communists, Christians, 
Americans, French, Germans, Nazis, the mentally ill, neurotics, wealthy women, and 
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people with strong personalities, not to mention psychoanalysts themselves. The point 
is that the context in which the interviewees are speaking is a heterogeneous field of 
simplified and usually denigrated alternatives. 
 
By way of summary, alternative representations can be characterised in the following 
way. Alternative representations existing within social representations are a necessary 
outcome of the existing plurality of representations. They enable people subscribing 
to different representations to communicate with each other, even if only in a partial 
way. Alternative representations are potentially both destabilizing and protective. The 
can destabilize because they allow the alternative within, but they are protective 
because they stereotype that alternative and as such can aid ingroup members in 
fending off challenging arguments and even immunise them against conversion.  
 
Alternative Representations in Psychoanalysis 
 
In order to illustrate the utility of the concept of alternative representations, it is useful 
to draw upon Moscovici’s (1988, p. 221) distinction between hegemonic, polemical 
and emancipated representations.  The aim of the present section is to characterise the 
manifestation of alternative representations within hegemonic, polemical and 
emancipated representations and to present illustrations from Psychoanalysis. 
 
First, hegemonic representations are described by Moscovici (1988) as being 
contemporary variants of collective representations: they are coercive, uniform, and 
unchallenged. An example of a contemporary collective, or hegemonic, representation 
is individualism (Farr, 1998). It is a pervasive assumption which is often unquestioned 
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in contemporary society. For example, it is embedded in our meritocratic institutions 
such as school and university, in which it is the taken for granted assumption that the 
unit of grading is the individual. Of course, however, contemporary society is also 
more concerned with rising individualism than ever before, and as such, it is a moot 
point whether even this representation is genuinely collective or hegemonic. This only 
underscores the questionable nature of collective representations, and underscores the 
need for the concept of social representations. In any case, we can characterise 
hegemonic representations as completely devoid of alternative representations. In this 
sense, hegemonic representations are completely egocentric, and they orient to and 
dialogue with no alternative perspectives.  
 
Second, emancipated representations circulate with a degree of autonomy in society. 
Emancipated representations are forged in the context of a field of diverse 
alternatives. The field of health contains several emancipated representations, such as 
those originating with doctors, traditional healers, and patients (Wagner, Duveen, 
Themel & Verma, 1999; Foster, 2003).  
 
The representations of psychoanalysis which Moscovici describes as circulating in the 
liberal press can be characterised as emancipated. The Catholic representation of 
psychoanalysis circulates side-by-side with a range of alternatives. Indeed, most of 
the newspapers analysed by Moscovici (p. 213) contain a diversity of views towards 
psychoanalysis – none is hegemonic. Rather each view is forced to come into contact 
with alternatives. And the use of humour and irony (e.g., p. 253 & p. 325) clearly 
demonstrate that alternative representations are in play. Emancipated representations, 
and their playful relation to alternative representations, are also evident in the 
 16
interview data that Moscovici analyses. Consider the following excerpt from a 
mother’s interview. 
 
I’ve never tried to apply psychoanalysis in order to understand myself or other 
people ….. People around me do, young people (my sons in particular take 
something of an interest in it), they’ve read lots of books on the question and 
they try to use psychoanalysis to understand the way their little sister behaves. 
And they criticize me for not bringing them up properly, for giving them 
complexes. I think all mothers should be given a little handbook explaining 
the basics of psychoanalysis, if only to stop their children from criticizing 
them in that way (Moscovici, 2008, p. 118, underlining added to indicate the 
invocation of the alternative representation) 
 
This mother takes up a position outside of psychoanalysis, which, she says, she has 
never tried to use either to understand herself or anyone else. The relevant point for 
the present analysis is that although she does not use psychoanalysis, she is able to 
attribute a working model of psychoanalysis to her children, and, through them she is 
in effect using the theory. She is using the theory to understand what her children 
think of her parenting. She reveals the alternative representation when she says: “they 
criticize me for not bringing them up properly, for giving them complexes”. The idea 
that not brining children up properly leads to complexes is a common interpretation of 
psychoanalysis, and in relation to this mother, it is the alternative to her rejection of 
psychoanalysis. It is not necessarily a representation which this mother subscribes to, 
but it is a representation that she uses to understand her children’s views on her.  
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Third, polemical representations, which are evident in Moscovici’s analysis of 
propaganda, are elaborated in the context of an inter-group ideological conflict. 
Polemical representations tend to have one major alternative representation, which is 
not a real alternative, but rather a rhetorical counter point. The Communists’ 
representation of psychoanalysis, is a clear example. The Communists were engaged 
in an ideological struggle with capitalism. Within this context, psychoanalysis was 
elaborated in a polarized manner, as a tool of capitalism, and thus as something to be 
resisted. In a polemical representation one would expect to find one alternative, or 
shadow, representation. Moreover, one would expect this alternative to be a 
caricature, a straw man, which serves only to reinforce the ingroup’s representation. 
The following quotation from a Communist interviewed for Psychoanalysis illustrates 
the way in which an alternative representation manifests within a polemical 
representation. 
 
Psychoanalysis claims to be a therapy, or even a worldview (amongst other 
things, it claims to be able to explain the origin and development of society in 
terms of conflict with the libido). It is in fact a falsifying tool that uses so-
called complexes to cover up social conflicts. The use that is being made of it 
today, especially in the USA, is the best proof of that. (Moscovici, 2008, p.76, 
underlining added to indicate the alternative representation) 
 
The direct representation of psychoanalysis, evident in this Communist perspective, is 
that it is a capitalist ideology which conceals social conflicts as problems within 
individuals which can be dealt with by interventions at the level of the individual. The 
alternative representation is presented in the first sentence which describes 
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psychoanalysis as ‘claiming’ to explain the origin and development of society in 
terms of a conflict between the libido and reality. The alternative representation 
indicates a working model of psychoanalysis, even if it is a caricature. And the 
alternative is evident despite it being rejected outright. The alternative is presented, 
but held at a distance: the alternative “claims to be able to explain”. This phrase works 
hard to separate the alternative from reality. The phrase “claims to explain” or even 
just “explains” would perhaps be insufficient to contain, and neutralise, the 
alternative. 
 
In Moscovici’s analysis of the way in which the Communist representation of 
Psychoanalysis is built upon the alternative (Moscovici, 2008, figure 15.1) we can see 
just how elaborate the alternative representation is. Yet, despite being built upon an 
opposition it is striking how little credence is given to the alternative, and how rigid 
the representation of the alternative is. The result is that despite the ever-present 
existence of the alternative representation, the main representation is not 
compromised and the alternative is simply dismissed. In short, there is no dialogical 
interchange between the main representation and the alternative. Strictly speaking, the 
coexistence of the main and alternative representation means that we are dealing with 
a case of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 2008, p. 190), yet, these coexisting 
representations do not seem to be in any creative or productive dialogical relation. 
The dialogical relation is completely asymmetrical, and although ever present, the 
alternative representation is never given real voice. The question we need to as, is: 
why is the alternative representation within a polemical representation resistant to 
dialogue? 
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Semantic barriers to dialogue 
 
There are many ways in which representations protect themselves from the potential 
change implied by dialogue with alternatives. Perhaps the most common way is 
through manipulation of who has access to the debate. Excluding interested parties 
violates the ideals of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989; Jovchelovitch, 1995), but is 
a very effective way of maintaining the symbolic order. However, I do not want to 
dwell on the ways in which the symbolic order is sustained through manipulations of 
the public sphere. Rather I want to remain at the semantic level, and consider the 
ways in which certain semantic structures inhibit dialogue with alternative 
representations. That is to say I want to focus upon the way in which particular 
meaning complexes can prevent dialogical engagement with alternative 
representations. Moscovici (2008, p. 334) refers to such meaning complexes as 
“semantic barriers” and in the present section I want to draw out the two main 
semantic barriers that he identifies, and then add to this a consideration of five 
additional semantic barriers. 
 
1) Rigid oppositions 
In his detailed analysis of propaganda, and how its logic of representation operates, 
Moscovici (2008) identifies rigid opposition as a central semantic barrier. “Negation 
is,” he writes, “a natural feature of the cognitive structure of propaganda” (p. 315). 
The communist representation of psychoanalysis is built upon not just one, but many 
rigid oppositions: Marxist psychology is scientific while psychoanalysis is pseudo 
science, Marxist psychology enhances workers’ interests while psychoanalysis 
undermines their interests, and so on (see Moscovici, 2008, Figure 15.1). Although 
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there are many distinct oppositions they are all part of a larger opposition, namely 
communism vs capitalism, and at a moral level, good vs bad. These oppositions are 
rigid in the sense that they do not allow rapprochements: each pole of the opposition 
demands “total support from the subject, or total rejection” (Moscovici, 2008, p.325). 
The rigidity of this network of oppositions inhibits dialogical relations between the 
core representation and the alternative, because the relation between these 
representations is fixed a priori. 
 
2) Transfer of meaning 
The second semantic barrier that Moscovici identifies concerns the transfer of 
emotion from core oppositions to secondary oppositions. For example, in the 
Communist press, the term psychoanalysis is linked to the term American in the oft 
repeated phrase “American psychoanalysis”. This linkage, Moscovici (2008, p.330ff) 
argues, transfers the richly elaborated and emotional opposition of American 
capitalism to American psychoanalysis. This categorisation of psychoanalysis as 
American is an oversimplification, of course, but in itself, this categorisation avoids 
the need for subtle thought – the known ‘facts’ about America are transferred to 
psychoanalysis. This political frame for conceptualising psychoanalysis is loaded, 
none of the evidence needs to be considered, because the broader opposition to 
Americanism applies. This frame then acts as a semantic barrier inhibiting any 
potentially challenging dialogue with psychoanalysis.  
 
3) Prohibited thoughts 
Moving beyond Moscovici’s analysis of the semantic barriers, we can identify a third 
barrier in the form of negatively sanctioned or prohibited thoughts. This particular 
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semantic barrier works to limit the extent to which people work to enrich their 
understanding of the other’s representation. Examples include utterances such as 
“psychoanalysis is the work of the devil” (p. 135) and “[e]ncouraging people to look 
at themselves too closely is a very bad idea. It’s the best way to create misfits” (p. 50). 
These meanings mark out the alternative representation as dangerous. To entertain or 
elaborate the alternative representation would be to either side with the devil or 
become a misfit. This mechanism inhibits elaboration of the alternative representation 
in part through fear. The phenomenon of heresy is an institutional mechanism 
operating to create the same kind of semantic barrier. This semantic mechanism has 
been described by Valsiner (2005) in his analysis of ‘promoter signs’ which either 
promote or prohibit certain lines of thought. This semantic barrier gains its power 
from a logical extrapolation. Given the major premise that psychoanalysis creates 
misfits, and the minor premise that one does not want to become a misfit, it follows 
logically that one should keep away from psychoanalysis. 
 
4) Separation 
An alternative to prohibiting the elaboration of the alternative representation is 
separating it from the main representation. This semantic mechanism allows 
elaboration of the alternative, precisely because it ceases to be threatening to the core 
representation. The semantic mechanism of separation is particularly evident amongst 
Catholics who are keen to elaborate psychoanalysis, but need to ensure that it does not 
conflict with their faith. One Catholic says: “Faith is a different domain to science; 
there’s no conflict” (p. 134). Another says “faith is grace and opens up the soul; 
certain problems to do with faith may come within the remit of psychoanalysis, but 
there’s no absolute relationship” (p. 134). This latter quotation insists upon a 
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separation between faith and psychoanalysis, yet also concedes a degree of 
relationship – arguably the semantic barrier is only partially successful. The 
interesting point about separation as a semantic barrier is that by virtue of separating 
the core from the alternative representation, and thus blocking dialogical interchange, 
this particular semantic block opens up the possibility of elaborating the alternative 
representation. These Catholics can proceed to find out about psychoanalysis and 
even engage in psychoanalysis confident in the assertion that it will not interfere with 
their faith. Exactly how they will respond when they read about Freud’s interpretation 
of religion is unclear. Presumably this type of semantic barrier works in conjunction 
with a selective appropriation and elaboration of the alternative representation to 
ensure than no conflicts do arise. 
 
5) Stigma 
A fifth semantic barrier to dialogical relations between the main and alternative 
representations is stigmatisation. The stigmatisation here is of people who subscribe 
to psychoanalysis, especially the patients. People who go to psychoanalysts are 
thought to be “fashionable women” who “don’t know what to do with themselves” 
(p.64). Patients are described as “pseudo-hysterical women”, and sometimes there is 
the suggestion of sexual relations with the psychoanalyst. The patients, assumed to be 
women, are said to “lie on a bed, tell lots of stories about their lives and sometimes 
sleep with the psychoanalyst” (p.64). The point to make about this stigmatisation of 
the patients is that it operates as a semantic barrier, not only discouraging people from 
becoming patients, but also from even beginning to take the patient role by, for 
example, engaging in self-analysis. The stigmatisation marks the alternative 
representation as clearly ‘for other people’ and ‘not for self’ and accordingly blocks 
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any movement towards or even elaboration of the alternative representation. Stigma is 
similar to prohibition, but it works in a more subtle way. The stigmatising 
representation, in so far as it is a social representation, is shared by the ingroup, and as 
such, each individual within the ingroup knows how other ingroup members will react 
if they are seen to entertain the alternative representation. That is to say, this 
representation creates a structure of recognition within the ingroup which promises to 
withhold the recognition of the entire group to any one member who is seen to engage 
with the alternative. 
 
6) Undermining the motive 
The sixth semantic barrier entails undermining the motives of the psychoanalysts. 
Moscovici (p. 100-101) describes the representation of psychoanalysts as charlatans, 
conmen and sex maniacs. In response to the question: “What is your image of the 
psychoanalyst?” the responses were “a man who wants to make money”, “a charlatan 
who’s rolling in money” and “a maniac who takes an interest in the sexuality of others 
because he is obsessed with his own.” The semantic content of this representation 
attacks the motives of psychoanalysts and importantly provides an excuse to discount 
the significance of what they say. If the psychoanalyst says that someone has a 
neurosis or complex, then it can be dismissed because it is in the interests of the 
psychoanalyst (as a greedy conman) to say this. Equally, if the psychoanalyst gives an 
explanation in terms of sexuality, this can also be dismissed as originating in the 
obsessions of the psychoanalyst. Thus again the alternative representation, in this case 
the views of the psychoanalyst, are blocked for entering into dialogical relation with 
the core representation. The mechanism of the barrier in this case, however, is 
particular: rather than prohibiting, separating or stigmatising, undermining the motive 
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of psychoanalysts is particular to the content of psychoanalysis and provides ingroup 
members with widely applicable ad hominem arguments for dismissing the alternative 
representation.  
 
7) Bracketing 
The seventh semantic barrier operates at a textual level, by bracketing and holding in 
question alternative representations. Consider the following utterance from one of 
Moscovici’s (Moscovici, 2008, p. 76) interviewees: “Psychoanalysis… claims to be 
able to explain the origin and development of society in terms of conflict with the 
libido”. This utterance holds psychoanalysis as a representation belonging to others in 
suspense and at a distance. Instead of saying that psychoanalysis ‘reveals’ the origin 
of society to be conflicts with the libido, the speaker uses the term “explain”. While 
there can be only one revelation, there can be many explanations. Thus the use of this 
particular term places psychoanalysis as one explanation among many. But more than 
this, the speaker does not simply say ‘psychoanalysis explains’ or indeed that ‘it 
claims to explain’ instead the speaker goes for a triple bracketing with “claims to be 
able to explain”. Thus the speaker holds the alternative representation apart from the 
status of reality. Other linguistic phrases which serve this same semantic function 
include: “psychoanalysis claims that,” “so-called complexes,” “they think that,” “they 
say,” “they believe that,” “they try to explain” and so on. The terms “claim,” “so-
called,” “think,” “say,” “believe,” and so on are used to manage the multiplicity of 
representations. These terms encourage one to take a certain representation as taken-
for-granted, while putting alternatives into question. In short, these terms police the 
boundary of what is accepted as real. 
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The above analysis has identified seven semantic barriers that enable people to treat 
alternative representations as foreign bodies, isolated and quarantined from dialogue. 
Dialogicality,” according to Markova (2003, p. 85), is the “capacity of the human 
mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of the Alter.” 
The basic idea presented above, is that semantic barriers can hinder dialogicality, that 
is they hinder our capacity to creatively engage with the Alter in general, and the 
alternative representation in particular.  
 
There are doubtless additional semantic barriers at work and which have yet to be 
identified. There are certainly other semantic barriers that operate in other fields of 
content, but which are not applicable to the study of the representation of 
psychoanalysis. For example, in cases of intergroup conflict it is common to dismiss 
the perspective of the other, and the alternative representation they espouse, by 
claiming that they are crazy, senseless and/or hell-bent upon destruction, and as such, 
there is no rational alternative representation to be elaborated. 
 
The present analysis has focused upon semantic barriers to dialogue within and 
between people and groups. However, there could also be a corresponding analysis of 
‘semantic promoters’, namely, the meanings which promote dialogue with alternative 
representations. For example, the absence of any of the seven identified semantic 
barriers could be described as promoting dialogue. If, for example, instead of 
prohibiting or stigmatising alternative representations they were promoted then there 
would be an incentive to elaborate alternative representations. Equally, if instead of 
making rigid oppositions there were less rigid oppositions not clearly aligned with 
good and bad, then again, potentially dialogicality would be stimulated. One could 
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also add to this list the dynamics of irony and humour, which Moscovici (2008, p. 
325) points towards as enabling a free play of representation.  
 
Conclusion: Varieties of cognitive polyphasia 
 
One of the main questions in Psychoanalysis is the relation between the social and the 
cognitive. That is the question of how social relations and the plurality of 
representations in circulation shape our cognitive processes. Articulation of this 
relation has been a central goal for many sociocultural psychologists. Moscovici’s 
contemporary contribution is to demonstrate that it is too simplistic to equate the 
increasing heterogeneity in society with an increasing heterogeneity of thought. The 
structural differentiation of society and globalisation are putting more heterogeneous 
representations into contact, and increasingly we have to learn to live in a world of 
alternative representations. Yet this does not mean that people become more open to 
alternative representations, more able to reflect upon their own representations, more 
tolerant, or more decentred in their thinking. The concept of ‘semantic barriers’ is 
important because it enables us to see that there are additional factors at work which 
can constrain thought processes. 
 
Research has shown that so-called traditional societies can be heterogeneous and 
stimulate considerable self-critique, irony and questioning (e.g., Pigg, 1996; Gillespie, 
2006). And Moscovici’s analysis of the Communist representation of psychoanalysis 
demonstrates that in contemporary society, a representation can adapt to a context of 
plurality, can have embedded within it alternative representations, and yet this does 
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not necessarily lead to self-questioning, let alone self-critique. Propagandistic forms 
of representation can still thrive in the context of a plurality of representations. 
 
If propaganda were able to operate without consideration of alternatives, it would 
surely prefer this mode of operating. However in contemporary societies it is afforded 
no such luxury. Contemporary conditions, outlined by Moscovici in the opening of 
Psychoanalysis, mean that few social representations exist in isolation. In 
contemporary societies, representations cultivated in diverse domains and 
geographical regions are brought together. Accordingly there are invariably 
alternatives which cannot be ignored. This is why contemporary propaganda needs 
more subtle means of maintaining its privileged position. It needs to be able to 
incorporate alternative representations, thus enabling a semblance of rational dialogue 
and an ability to orient to the perspectives of others, yet the existence of an elaborate 
system of semantic barriers ensures that the potential for dialogical transformation is 
minimised. These semantic barriers are subtle. They do not simply dismiss the 
alternative. The semantic barriers enable the elaboration of an alternative 
representation. The Communists, for example, are able to operate with psychoanalytic 
concepts, to have some image of how psychoanalysts think, and thus would be able to 
hold a dinner table conversation with a psychoanalyst. The semantic barrier enables 
this whilst also neutralising the dialogical potential. 
 
Moscovici’s (2008) analysis of the diffusion of psychoanalysis shows us not only that 
there is cognitive polyphasia, but also that there are varieties of cognitive polyphasia. 
Just because there are co-existing representations does not necessitate dialogical 
tension or transformation. The present analysis suggests that we need to conceive of a 
 28
continuum between emancipated and polemical representations in terms of the degree 
of dialogue or tension between the main representation and the alternative 
representation. At the emancipated end, there is the potential for cross contamination 
and genuine dialogical interchange between the main representation and the 
alternative representations. At the polemical end of the continuum, the alternative 
representation tends to be locked, by semantic barriers, into a rigid and often un-
dialogical and uncreative relation to the main representation. These semantic barriers 
are one of the subtle means employed by polemical representations to adapt to 
contexts of a plurality of potentially competing representations. These barriers stand 
between the sociological and psychological levels, enabling intolerance to exist at a 
psychological level while plurality increases at the sociological level. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. I am grateful to George Gaskell for making me aware of this interpretation of 
alternative representations. 
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